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In this paper I show that a novel ontic reading of explanation, 
intending to capture the de re essential features of individuals, can 
support the qualitative view of individual essences. It is argued 
further that the putative harmful consequences of the Leibniz 
Principle (PII) and its converse for the qualitative view can be 
avoided, provided that individual essences are not construed in the 
style of the naïve bundle theory with set-theoretical identity-
conditions. Adopting either the more sophisticated two-tier BT or, 
alternatively, the neo-Aristotelian position of taking essences as 
natures in the Aristotelian sense, can help to evade these main 
charges against the qualitative view. The functional parallels with 
the alternative haecceitistic view of individuation and individual 
essence will also be considered. !
Keywords: qualitative individual essence, bundle theory, Identity of 
Indiscernibles, Aristotelian essentialism, ontic explanation, 
explanatory-gap argument !!!
The qualitative view of individual essence assumes that an individual has, 
apart from its specific or kind essence, an individual essence as well, one 
that is unique to it, which can be spelled out in terms of qualitative 
features. Authors working on the topic further assume that the qualitative 
features can be captured by sets of nontrivial essential properties (Forbes 
1985, 99; Lowe 1995, 69-70). The set-theoretical construal of the 
qualitative features, however, has the risk of excessive rigidity when it 
comes to the issue of identity through worlds and times: any change, even 
the most trifling one, in the set of qualitative features would result in the 
numerical change of the individual. This is precisely what the converse of  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the Leibniz principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) says: 
property-discernibility entails numerical difference.  The highly disputed 1
(PII) itself guarantees that property-indiscernibility is sufficient for 
numerical identity. Though (PII) is typically not formulated for modal 
cases, the qualitative view seems to lose much of its appeal under the 
potential risk of its being committed to (PII) and its converse. 
The present account markedly deviates from the set-theoretical reading of 
the qualitative view. My claim is that the qualitative features constituting 
the individual essence or nature of an individual make a structured, 
function- and goal-oriented constellation. Individual essences cannot be 
captured by a mere conjunction of properties. Therefore, this account 
does not invoke the mere listing of the features obeying set-theoretical 
identity conditions . To note, (PII) and its converse concern the mere 
listing of properties. I suggest that by adopting a version of the qualitative 
view that is more refined than the naïve bundle theory, one can avoid the 
main charge that the qualitative view is vulnerable to objections that stem 
from (PII) and its converse. 
Apart from evading this charge, a positive support for positing qualitative 
individual essences can be found in the form of the ontic or metaphysical 
version of explanation. The explanatory role of the qualitative features 
has already been explored (Ujvári 2013a), but now I think that the 
explanatory approach can be strengthened with the metaphysically 
committing version. In this version the epistemic reading of explanation 
is replaced by its ontic reading; this represents also a decisive step in the 
essentialist-explanatory account of modalities.  The point is that once de 2
re essentialism has been liberated from the modal-logical view of 
necessity, explanation in the ontic sense could be given a crucial role in 
determining the essential features of things.  And the ontic reading of 3
essential features is naturally coupled with conceiving ‘individuation in 
the metaphysical sense (as opposed to the cognitive or epistemic)’ as it is 
recently stressed by Lowe.  4
Admittedly, the nature of support for qualitative individual essences on 
the part of explanation in the ontic sense is not a strict, compelling 
argument: it inclines rather than necessitates its conclusion in virtue of  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 The converse of (PII) often referred to as Leibniz’s Law is obviously impeccable in the 1
context of classical logic as a characterization of identity. However, the metaphysical 
problems of counterfactual identity and identity through times situate the converse of 
(PII) into another perspective.
 Kment (2014, ch. 4-5), Gorman (2005, 276-289). As a forerunner of the view, see 2
Salmon (1984, 84-134).
 See Fine (1994) and Gorman (2005).3
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the fact that the notion of qualitative individual essence coheres well with 
the essentialist-explanatory conception. ‘Cohering well’ means that once 
this conception is adopted, the significance of the very notion of 
qualitative individual essence increases. 
The familiar alternative account of the identity of individuals through 
worlds and times is the haecceitistic account. Concerning the 
contemporary versions of haecceitism, I take them as elaborations on 
Kaplan’s original claim that individuals can be identified through 
counterfactual situations without making recourse to their attributes or 
qualitative features (Kaplan 1975). While not denying the relevance and 
particular suitability of haecceitism in certain contexts, I think that much 
can be claimed in favor of the qualitative view of individual essence as 
well. The paper does not intend to contribute to any current debate 
between proponents of the qualitative view of individual essence and 
proponents of its haecceitistic view. Rather, the goal is only to bolster the 
position of the qualitative view by underlining its role in explanation in 
the ontic sense and by evading the main standard charge of the view 
being committed to (PII) and its converse. 
In the first section of the paper, I consider the prospects for the qualitative 
view of individual essence backed by the ontic reading of explanation. I 
also show here that (PII) is not a real threat to the tenability of this view. 
In the second section, I point out that individuation in the metaphysical 
sense requires that individuation should be told apart from mere 
particularization of the type. In the metaphysical sense individuation is 
separated from mere identification, say, by ostension. Consulting the 
literature, one finds a striking overlap between the functions and roles 
attributed to haecceity by advocates of haecceitism, and the functions and 
roles attributed to qualitative individual essence by supporters of the 
qualitative view. So, in the third section, I explore the parallels, and in the 
assessment, I find that the explanatory function is a further crucial factor 
in the comparison. Turning to the tenable versions of the qualitative 
account, I shall present only briefly the two-tier view of BT (bundle 
theory) since it has already been discussed in the literature (Simons 1994; 
Cleve 1985; Ujvári 2013b). The neo-Aristotelian version of essentialism 
has also been spelled out many times; therefore, I shall add only, in the 
fourth section, a further point about how this position is applicable to a 
sound theory of individuation and individual essence.  To anticipate, I 5
shall argue that Aristotelian natures can fruitfully be explored as bearers 
of the qualitative aspect of individual essence. In the last section of the 
paper, I visit the question of relationality, and clarify what I take to be 
‘genuine’ individuals.  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1. The ontic reading of explanation and the threat of (PII) !
When it comes to the task of explaining the actions, behavior, 
dispositions, etc. of individuals, it seems that this task requires 
considering individual essences in addition to their specific essences. 
Otherwise our purported explanations about individuals would remain 
hopelessly incomplete and gappy. According to the explanatory-gap 
argument suggested in the literature, certain possibilities of individuals 
would remain unexplained, and even unexplainable, if sortal essences 
plus accidental features were the only candidates for the explanans.  Say, 6
the sortal essence of ‘being human’ admits a wide range of possibilities 
that humans are capable of realizing. But considering the actual 
possibilities of determinate human individuals, the sortal possibilities 
should be tailored to the idiosyncratic character of the given individual 
aimed at explaining why, for example, certain future developments are 
open to this individual, and some others are excluded, while both are 
tolerated by the specific human essence. 
The significance of the explanatory function can get further support from 
the familiar symmetry-thesis concerning explanation and prediction. It is 
a truism that a good explanation could function as a prediction as well. 
Predictions, if they are not mere projections of past regularities to the 
future in the Humean fashion, should rely on explanatory connections. It 
is hard to imagine how our predictive practice could manage successfully 
without analyzing and assessing the qualitative features of the items, 
including those of the individuals, that show up in the predicted scenario. 
The explanatory approach to positing individual essences can be 
strengthened with the metaphysical version of explanation. This version 
presupposes a departure from ‘logical’ modalism: as Kit Fine has argued 
in his criticism of the modal view of de re essentialist claims, the logical-
modal notion of necessity cannot fully capture the metaphysics of de re 
essentialist locutions. Since these locutions should do with the very 
nature of things whereby they receive their identity, therefore, de re 
essentialism enjoys a distinctive metaphysical status not to be reduced to 
logical necessity. Departure from logical modalism continued with 
Gorman’s suggestion that ’explanation’ is the clue to decide whether a 
given feature of a thing is essential. He says that ‘F is essential to x just 
in case F is (i) a characteristic of x and (ii) not explained by any other 
characteristic of x’ (Gorman 2005, 284). Not being explained by other 
characteristics of x does not, however, render the notion of ’essential’ 
mysterious: features which are fundamental, and thus unexplained 
relative to the very nature of a given thing, may require explanation in 
some other contexts.  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The notion of ’explanation’ applied here is ’ontic’. As Gorman says, ‘to 
speak thus of explanation is to use the word in its ontic and not in its 
epistemic sense.’ The key to this ontic use is that ‘explanation is a real 
relation between things’ (Gorman 2005, 283). The mind-independence of 
such real explanatory relations was also stressed long ago by Wesley 
Salmon. Recently, Kment has argued in a similar way: when the issue is 
that ’x explains y’ or ’x is the reason why y obtains’ then ‘explanation in 
this sense is a metaphysical relation, not an epistemic one’ (Kment 2014, 
5). 
It seems to me that the best way to render explanation intelligible as a 
metaphysical relation is to associate it with grounding. Grounding and 
explanation (in the metaphysical sense) are relations which are 
constitutive of things, and they may be contrasted with projected 
regularity patterns in the Humean epistemic sense. As Maurin has argued 
quite recently, grounding is ‘involved’ in ‘metaphysical explanations’ in 
virtue of grounding being ‘tracked’ by these explanations (Maurin 2017). 
Though the precise nature of the grounding - metaphysical explanation 
link is currently still disputed, it is clear from the discussions that it is 
metaphysical explanation about the real nature or essence of things that 
constitutes one of the relata and not explanation in the epistemic sense 
(Thompson 2016). Advocates of the metaphysical theory of grounding 
are keen on avoiding the epistemic sense of explanation: although 
‘grounding is often called an explanatory notion ... to us it seems 
advisable to separate the objective notion of grounding which belongs to 
the field of metaphysics from an epistemically loaded notion of 
explanation’, emphasize Correia and Schneider in their introduction to 
the topic (Correia and Schneider 2014, 24). Congenial to these efforts, we 
can witness Kment's recording a ‘shift of focus from the modal to the 
explanatory domain’. The shift covers concerns about ‘grounding, 
essence, fundamentality’. These new concerns change the direction of 
entailment: according to Kment, ‘entailment seems to hold only in one 
direction – from the metaphysical claim to the modal one’ (Kment 2014, 
14). 
Without taking a position about these essentialist-explanatory concerns, I 
argue conditionally: given these concerns, particularly the emphasis on 
the priority of explanation in the ontic sense and the metaphysical 
reading of de re essential features, one might feel a temptation to consider 
seriously the qualitative account of individual essence and individuation. 
Clearly, the qualitative view cannot be dismissed, since, how could a non-
qualitative haecceity, a bare ’thisness’ constitute the metaphysical nature 
of a thing, let alone the explanatory role of that nature in the ontic sense. 
The special virtue of the ontic reading of explanation is that it can help 
ruling out a possible objection to the explanatory-gap argument: one 
might object, for example, that a mere epistemic point is irrelevant from 
the metaphysical perspective.  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A further argument, in favor of the qualitative view, rests on the 
presumed analogy between modal explanations for continuants by 
appealing to their individual essence and explanation of singular event 
causation by appealing to individual event essences (Ujvári 2013a). 
Though the analogy has some appeal, it has not gained universal 
acceptance. For example, Diekemper has claimed that events, unlike 
continuants, can be shown to have a primitive nonqualitative thisness or 
haecceity essential to them  (Diekemper 2009). 7
Here I am not going into the event-continuant dispute. Haecceitistic 
commitments just mentioned, it is worth considering though what would 
count, from the perspective of the haecceitistic position, as a sound 
objection to the positing of qualitative individual essences. It is not only 
Diekemper who seems to hold that Leibnizian (PII) is lethal for the 
qualitative view; Penelope Mackie also considers (PII) and its converse 
from the point of view of Leibnizian individual essence (Mackie 2006, 
22). Let us see these arguments in turn. Diekemper's strategy for 
defending non-qualitative thisness with events centers around seeking 
sound counter-examples to the Leibnizian Principle of the Identity of 
Indiscernibles. His point is that by demonstrating the numerical 
distinctness of Leibniz-indiscernible individuals with the help of such 
counter-examples, there opens the path to account for their distinctness in 
terms of a primitive, non-qualitative thisness (Diekemper 2009, 260). 
This treatment of Leibniz-indiscernible individuals seems to be one of the 
main merits of the haecceitistic approach. I think Diekemper’s point can 
be conceded with the provisio that it applies only to particulars that are 
merely tokens of some common type; typically, mass products qualify as 
such particulars. However, individuals with their unique essences do not 
illustrate the failure of (PII). One can feel here the need for spelling out 
the distinction between mere particulars and individuals; this will come in 
the next section. 
It is also implied in these discussions that the qualitative view of 
individuals, presumably fleshed out in terms of bundles of qualitative 
features, is vulnerable to the converse of (PII) since any change in the 
bundle or set of properties would, according to the converse of (PII), 
yield a different individual. Penelope Mackie explores this sort of critical  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match the standard approach in the literature. Briefly, he identifies nonqualitative features 
with impure qualitative features. See Diekemper (2009, 256). One can consult the 
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Adams (1979, 7), Armstrong (1978, 146-147; 2004, 13), Loux (1997, 128, footnote 19). 
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reasoning. Her starting point is the Leibnizian notion of individual 
essence which is characteristically super-essentialist. As she remarks, 
‘Leibniz holds that every property of an individual is essential to it’. This 
amounts to the position of ‘super-essentialism’ which is standardly 
attributed to Leibniz with respect to the notion of individuals. Mackie 
then goes on to show how this essentialist notion of individuals naturally 
gives rise to the Leibnizian identity condition in terms of complete 
property-indiscernibility governed by (PII). ‘The Identity of 
Indiscernibles guarantees a non-trivial distinction between the properties 
of any two individuals. But the consequence of this view – that of 
rendering false all claims to the effect that anyone or anything could have 
had a history in any way different from the actual history – is one that, for 
obvious reasons, most philosophers find unacceptable’ (Mackie 2006, 
22). Though Mackie refers here to the ‘Identity of Indiscernibles’ (PII), 
obviously, what she takes to be ‘the consequence of this view’ is the 
consequence of the converse of (PII). The latter states that the identity of 
things rules out any change in their properties; a claim found 
unacceptable by philosophers who are concerned about identity through 
worlds/times. 
While I do not deny problems with (PII) and its converse in metaphysical 
contexts, this is not the last verdict on the issue. If it were, the qualitative 
view would be doomed to failure, and even the explanatory reading with 
the ontic notion of explanation could not help to save it. Mackie is right 
in claiming that Leibnizian super-essentialism and the converse of (PII) 
are tailored for each other; but it does not follow that qualitative 
individual essence should be taken as coinciding with the complete set of 
properties of an individual. In fact, the individual essence does not cover 
the whole qualitative space for locating the individual. For example, 
some Leibniz scholars take efforts to point out that the complete notions 
of the individuals contain ‘incremental’ features as well apart from their 
essential features (Grimm 1970, Ishiguro 1979). The incremental features 
comprise the spatio-temporal location and other contextual aspects of the 
individual according to Grimm. Further, the individual essence within the 
qualitative space characterizing an individual need not be seen as a set of 
features whose members are supposed to be listed in agreement with 
(PII). Fortunately, the qualitative view has the appropriate resources to 
avoid the forced track of (PII). First, as I have said, the qualitative 
character of individual essence does not have to be captured by the 
Leibnizian complete notion of the individual. Recall that Leibnizian 
completeness is understood as the completeness of the set of the 
properties of the individual. Second, the qualitative character need not to 
be fleshed out in terms of a set-theoretical construal, since the structural 
aspects of the individual essence require a different approach. The 
qualitative account recommended here avoids falling prey to the 
vulnerable set-theoretical construal: i. e., that even a trifling change in the  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set of properties amounts to shifting to another individual. This 
uncomfortable consequence follows only if a naïve bundle theory is 
adopted with set-theoretical identity conditions. 
It is a false dilemma, however, that either one opts for qualitative 
individual essences, - but then one has to buy into a naïve bundle theory - 
or, in view of the failure of the naïve (BT), one is compelled to accept the 
haecceitistic account. In fact, there are more options. For example, the 
friend of the qualitative account can embrace a more sophisticated, two-
tier version of the bundle theory which is not vulnerable to the risks of 
the Leibniz Principle, or, alternatively, (s)he can appeal to the Aristotelian 
notion of nature or essence.  8
As to the first option, a core of essential features can be posited in the 
relation of tight bundling going proxy for an individual nature. Simons 
has adopted the notion of bundling from Husserl and he made an 
amendment to that notion by replacing Husserlian bundling on the 
specific level with tropist bundling on the individual level. The result is a 
two-tier (BT) with a qualitative nucleus in the core and accidental 
features in the outer fringe (Simons 1994). The crucial point is that the 
qualitative features in the tight bundling are not to be analyzed with the 
Leibniz principle.  The same can be vindicated, perhaps even more 9
directly, for Aristotelian natures leading to the second option. Here, again, 
the claim is that Aristotelian natures or essences, while qualitative, cannot 
be resolved into sets of qualitative features. In fact, a distinction can be 
made between a mere list of the properties and the qualitative essence 
(Oderberg, 2011). The details of the non-set theoretical construal of 
individual essence come a bit later. So, we can anticipate the conclusion 
that the tenability of the qualitative account of individual essence and 
individuation does not hinge on the tenability of (PII). !
2. Individuation vs Particularization !
By ‘individual’ I do not mean just an arbitrary token of a type. Though 
instantiation captures the tokening of the type, it cannot serve as a clue to 
the individuation of the particular. The reason is that instantiation of a 
type yields only a bunch of particular tokens such that each token 
indiscriminately illustrates the type. In other words, each token is just a 
particularizer of the type. But particularization itself is indifferent to the 
issue which of the tokens of the relevant type fills the slot since any 
arbitrary token would do the same job. Further, ‘individuation’ of the par-  
30
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specific essences. The present suggestion is to explore the Aristotelian approach to 
individual natures as well.
 The claim that the bundle theory is not committed to PII is discussed by Matteo 9
Morganti (2011, 37-40).
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-ticular is ambiguous: it can mean the process or the result of securing 
unique reference to a particular or, alternatively, it can mean the grasping 
of the particular through its unique nature. The supposed unique nature is 
vital to counterfactual discourse and explanation about the individuals. 
Obviously, ‘uniqueness’ is a requirement on both readings: but, on one 
reading, only referential uniqueness is achieved while, on the other 
reading, the goal is to secure the uniqueness of the individual nature, that 
is, attributive uniqueness. In short, the referential/attributive ambiguity, 
very much familiar in the semantics of definite descriptions, is operating 
behind the metaphysical issues of individuation. 
The ambiguity inherent in the very notion of individuation is captured by 
Lowe in a similar vein. He recommends taking ‘individuation’ as an ontic 
notion, rather than as an epistemic one. He notes that corresponding to 
the two notions of individuation there are two principles of identity: the 
one which yields criteria for us to distinguish entities, while the other 
principle hangs together with ‘genuine individuation’. According to the 
latter principle, the identity of things ‘is received from that what makes 
them the very things what they are’, as Lowe quotes Locke. While 
agreeing with Lowe about this ontic notion, I am inclined to take the first 
as purely referential identification, used, in the first instance, for telling 
things apart. However, Lowe’s ‘genuine individuation’ targets the specific 
essence of things and not their individual essence. When explicating 
individuation as a ‘determination relation between entities’ Lowe says as 
an illustration, that ‘ x determines or “fixes” .... which of its kind y 
is’ (Lowe 2014, 216). So, individuation, for him, is the selecting of a 
particular token from among other tokens of a given specific type. It 
seems to me that this approach tells us about the particularization of the 
universal type rather than accounting for the individual as such. The latter 
task, however, requires separating individuation from mere 
particularization. 
There is still a temptation, at least in the Platonic tradition, to think of 
particulars merely as instances of types or species. The question, in that 
tradition, is what it is to be the particular instance of a type or species; 
and the answer, according to Boethius, is that the particular instantiates 
the species by virtue of ‘dividing’ it. Say, particular rabbits divide the 
species ‘Rabbit’. An equally important other question would be what 
makes some of the particulars genuine individuals, over and above the 
mere instantiation of the species. This question is typically ignored, or, 
even worse, individuality is practically identified with particularity as it 
can be illustrated by Jorge Gracia’s account of individuation. For him 
‘particular’ and ‘individual’ are ‘coextensive’, and he devotes a book to 
defending this position. The extensional overlap between being a 
particular and being an individual suffices for explanatory purposes as 
well according to him, since he explicitly says that ‘there is no great 
advantage in making a distinction between particularity and individuality’  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(Gracia 1988, 54).  10
Gracia’s effort is directed to draw the line between universals and 
particulars in a realist way which is obviously a legitimate enterprise; but 
it falls short of being a complete metaphysical theory of individuals. 
Obviously, for a thing to be a particular, and for it to be an individual, are 
two different aspects that can be told apart. The question arises then, what 
account can be provided for individuality, once particularization is well-
explained by the realist theory of instantiation. I think genuine 
individuality requires the notion of qualitative individual essence and 
individuation as supported here. The account that can fill the slot explores 
a ‘thick’ notion of individuals as opposed to the ‘thin’ notion of being an 
instance of a species, i. e., a mere particular. How ‘thick’ the notion 
should be is a further question. Presumably, not as thick as for Leibniz for 
whom only the complete set of the properties is individuating. It would 
be safe, though a truism, to say that the qualitative account of individual 
essence and individuation should avoid the Scylla of bare haecceity, and 
the Charybdis of the Leibnizian complete-concept notion of individuals. !
3. Roles of Haecceity and Qualitative Individual Essence Compared !
So far, I have been arguing for the qualitative view of individual essence. 
If one visits though the functions/roles attributed to haecceity and the 
functions/roles attributed to non-haecceitistic individual essence in the 
literature, one finds a substantial overlap between the two lists. A 
comparison will be illuminating. 
Rosenkrantz records the various functions of haecceity (Rosenkrantz 
1993). These are the following: 1. As a primitive thisness, it helps 
securing identity through worlds (see, also, Adams’ account); 2. In its 
semantic role, it turns de re discourse into de dicto eliminating thereby 
the problematic de re locutions (see Plantinga 1974); 3. In its epistemic 
role, discussed by Chisholm, the special status of self-knowledge is 
explained by grasping one's own haecceity; 4. It functions as the 
intension of proper names (see Plantinga 1974; Chisholm 1976). 
Losonsky summarizes the functions of individual essence (Losonsky 
1987). His item 1' is the same as 1. at Rosenkrantz, i. e., to secure 
transworld identity. 2' says : individual essence fills the slot at those 
worlds where a certain individual fails to exist. Its role is to match de re 
claims with the contingency of empirical existence. Say, Socrates is 
essentially/necessarily human, but he does not exist in every possible 
world. However, his individual essence, as an abstract and necessary 
existent, exists at those other worlds where he fails to exist. 2' has no 
equivalent in the haecceity-list. 3' says: individual essences as qualitative  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bundles illustrate the property-bundle view of individuals and, 
consequently, they fall under (PII). This use has no matching item - a 
pendant - in the haecceity list. 4' matches with 2 and 3 of the haecceity-
list: i. e., ‘to account for the knowledge we have of ourselves and other 
persons’. 5' says: individual essence is used as the principle of 
individuation: historically, the principle was applied to continuants, and 
recently the application is extended to events as well. 6' says: individual 
essences are used as senses of proper names. This semantic function has 
its pendant in the haecceity-list under 4. 
The survey shows that haecceity and qualitative individual essence as 
metaphysical posits are both supposed to explain: a) trans-world identity, 
b) self-knowledge and other de re attributions, and c) the intension of 
proper names. Assessing the functions, one finds that securing transworld 
identity is the strongest support for both posits. The essential nature of 
the individual without which it would not be what it is, saves identity-
claims from the fragility of accidental changes. Haecceity can achieve the 
same goal albeit with relying on direct referential devices instead of 
qualitative aspects. The idea is that a thing can never lose its haecceity, 
and we can keep track of the same individual with referential devices.  11
As to the role they are supposed to play in self-knowledge and also in 
turning other de re attributions into de dicto claims, I am rather 
skeptical.  It seems to me that the reductive move of eliminating de re 12
locutions is a misapplication of haecceity and/or individual essence since 
both are the vehicles of de re metaphysical claims. As to their 
involvement in self-knowledge, I do not see any reason why they should 
be involved. We enjoy privileged access to our mental items and their 
ownership, but it would be false to think that there must be something 
with entitative status that is responsible for this immediate grasp. And the 
last point, motivating the posit of both haecceity and individual essence,  
33
 It seems to me that the distinction between the ‘strong’ and the ‘weak’ versions of 11
haecceitism suggested by Cover and Hawthorne can help the haecceitist in accounting for 
this function. According to them strong haecceitism does not supervene on general 
propositions in explaining transworld identity, while weak haecceitism accepts the role of 
some general propositions in the explanation of transworld identities. See Cover and 
O’Leary-Hawthorne (1999).
 The reductive move is conceived by Rosenkrantz in the following way: when a person 12
S directly attributes F-ness to an object X, S grasps the conjunction of the haecceity of X 
and F-ness. Thus, one can eliminate de re beliefs in favor of de dicto beliefs with the help 
of haecceity (See Rosenkrantz 1993, 34). Haecceity is claimed to have a role in self-
knowledge as well: it is Chisholm who makes a Kantian start by noting that first-person 
reference is indispensable to knowledge of external things and that reference is secured 
via grasping one's own haecceity. Thus, haecceity becomes, in his account, a precondition 
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claim and not a de re one.
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is that they serve as intensions of proper names. I am not going to get into 
the semantic issue. 
It has become clear from the survey that the explanatory role has not been 
taken into account either by Losonsky or Rosenkrantz. However, with the 
explanatory role in mind, the significance of the notion of qualitative 
individual essence increases. !
4. Aristotelian Natures, Individual Essence and Existence !
In one version of the qualitative view individual essences are closely 
connected to the property-bundle construction of individuals (Plantinga 
1974; Forbes 1985). As I have said earlier, the qualitative aspect of 
individual essences is not to be fleshed out in terms of the set-theoretical 
construction of the naïve bundle-theory taking every qualitative feature 
homogeneously, as equally contributing to the identity of the individual. 
This approach is vulnerable even to trifling changes in the members of 
the bundle or set: this is a familiar defect of the set-theoretical 
construction. As a result, excessive essentialism ensues with the naïve 
bundle theory. In view of this problem it seems more reasonable to hold 
that qualitative individual essences are either tight bundles of essential 
properties with the special gluing relation of mutual foundation, as it was 
suggested in the first section, or, one might hold that they are natures in 
the Aristotelian sense. Let us consider now the virtues of this latter. 
Nature or essence in the Aristotelian sense, though qualitative, is clearly 
not identifiable with a set of properties. Aristotle seems to be aware of the 
difference. He says, that by giving the essence of a thing the ’what’ 
question is answered; but this important question is not answered by 
specifying some, or all, of the properties of the thing. He writes in the 
Metaphysics Book Z: ‘when we say of what quality a thing is, we say that 
it is good or beautiful ... but when we say what it is, we do not say 
“white” or “hot” or “three cubits long”, but “man” or “God”’ (Aristotle 
1984, 1028.15.). 
The Aristotelian notion of essence is the specific essence of substance-
kinds captured by definitions: ‘there is an essence only of those things 
whose formula is a definition’ (Aristotle 1984, 1030.5.). So, a definition 
captures the specific essence of a thing since a thing is what it is, by its 
specific essence. What about those other properties, including propria and 
accidents, that are not covered by the definitions? According to Aristotle 
these features have less substantial roles. While things ‘participate’ in 
these other qualitative features, they do not have their essences in this 
way: things do not ‘participate’ in their essences since they are what they 
are just by their specific essence. As Aristotle puts it: ‘nothing, then, 
which is not a species of a genus will have an essence – only species will 
have it, for in these the subject is not thought to participate in the attribu-  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-te’ (Aristotle 1984, 1030.10.). It is clear, then, that for Aristotle, to have a 
(specific) essence is not tantamount to participating in a set of features. I 
would say that the same applies for individual essences. These, while 
qualitative, cannot be analyzed compositionally for the same reason that 
specific essences cannot be so analyzed: they are natures, and not simply 
sets of properties. 
Non-compositionality does not mean, however, that the usual 
significance-conditions are disobeyed, and that we cannot meaningfully 
talk about the properties being entailed by the specific and/or the 
individual natures. As to the latter, one can say that an individual essence 
or nature entails each and every essential property of the individual 
including the specific essential properties. I can only agree with Plantinga 
who endorses such entailment (Plantinga 1974, 73; 2003, 56). But it does 
not follow that the individual nature itself could be analyzed reductively 
in terms of the conjunction of the component essential features. This 
point is important if we consider that the functional/teleological unity of 
the whole individual is under-determined by the mere conjunction of its 
component features. A conjunction is neutral with respect to the structure 
responsible for such unity. An anti-reductive claim, similar to mine, is put 
forth by Loux with respect to kinds or specific essences in his ‘substance 
theory of substance’ (Loux 1997). Recently, Oderberg defended the same 
point, by making a distinction between a mere list of properties and 
(qualitative) essence. He says that ‘an essence is more than a list: it is a 
structural, organizational unity’. He takes this distinction between 
p r o p e r t i e s a n d e s s e n c e ‘ a k e y f e a t u r e o f A r i s t o t e l i a n 
essentialism’ (Oderberg 2011, 99). 
To note, the compositional analysis, discarded here, is accepted by 
Rosenkrantz. He says, that ‘a conjunction of a haecceity and a universal 
essential property is an individual essence’ (Rosenkrantz 1993, 43). 
However, I have doubts as to whether individual essences can be resolved 
into such conjunctions.  
A further feature to be considered is the dependence of individual 
essences on the existential condition since it would be highly problematic 
to postulate individual essences for merely possible individuals. Let us 
visit now the existence-claim from the perspective of individual essences. 
While specific essences may remain unexemplified, at least in the 
Platonic tradition, most authors agree about the requirement that 
individual essences should be exemplified. In short, essence goes with 
existence in the case of individual essences. Even Plantinga, construing 
individual essences in a Platonic way, claims that ‘an essence is 
necessarily instantiated in some world or other’ (Plantinga 1974, 76). So, 
individual essences must be exemplified somewhere. But the contingency 
of existence is still preserved, on his account, since each world is such 




Still, there is something faulty with this solution that purports to provide 
for the contingent existence of concrete things. First, if instantiation is a 
trait common to specific essences and individual essences, as Plantinga 
holds, then the distinction between general existence-claims and singular 
existence-claims is obliterated. In this case, it applies to both kinds of 
existence-claims that to exist is to be instantiated. But the obliteration is 
hardly acceptable. The metaphysical difference that species are 
instantiable while individuals are not, has to be reflected in the logical 
distinction between the two kinds of existence. While common natures or 
forms have a threefold existence, at least according to medieval 
Aristotelians, as existing in themselves, and by ‘informing’ the things and 
the minds respectively, concrete individuals have only one ‘mode of 
existence’, and it is their bare existence. It would be mistaken to describe 
such existence as the instantiation of an individual essence. 
Second, Plantinga's scheme implies a Leibnizian arrangement of existent 
beings at a world. The existent beings as the instantiations of their 
individual essences must be compossible. Thus, the individual essence of 
each individual must contain a clause about the essences of every other 
individual at a given world, precisely in a Leibnizian way. Plantinga 
incorporates such clause into his definition of individual essence. He 
says, that the individual essence E of Socrates must be such that it is 
essential to Socrates; that it incorporates all the other entailed essential 
properties of him; ‘and finally, the complement of E is essential to every 
object distinct from Socrates’ (Platinga 1974, 76). It seems to me that this 
clause invites an unnecessary abundance of individual essences. 
Moreover, their abundance is promoted by Cambridge changes. Say, if a 
new contingent being comes into existence, then the rest of the 
population at that world acquires a new essence: the complement of 
essence E of the newborn individual. 
The upshot is that individual existence should not be conceived as the 
exemplification of an individual essence, rather, individual essences can 
be seen as having an existential precondition. I recommend here the 
existence-conditioned characterizations of individual essence given by 
Kit Fine, and developed by Roca-Royes (Fine 1994; Roca-Royes 2011). 
Though their position is formulated for the essential properties of 
individuals, it surely applies to individual essences as well. These 
properties are supposed to help ‘answer the question “what is a ?”’ where 
a is the individual whose nature is to be discovered. According to the 
characterization ‘if P is an essential property of a, a could not exist 
without being P’ (Roca-Royes 2011, 66). It is evident that being P is not 
tantamount to P’s being instantiated, for individual essences make sense 
only on the precondition of the existence of the individuals. As to the 
unrealized possibilities, we can say that the virtual realm of singular 
possibilities is something that actually does not obtain, rather than 
remaining ‘uninstantiated’.  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5. Qualitative Individual Essence and Relationality !
I owe the reader the support of my claim that some particulars are 
‘genuine individuals’. After all, what makes some particulars to be so? 
Also, it is time to consider what features are entailed by the qualitative 
individual essences. Are their features all monadic such that a ‘relational 
individual essence’ sounds like a contradictio in adjecto? 
Individual essence or nature is thought to belong so intimately to the 
thing that it is typically construed as an intrinsic feature. Obviously, it 
cannot be external to the thing; it cannot depend on its relation to other 
things. Thus, relationality seems to be undesirable in this context. 
Chisholm draws our attention to an ambiguity in referring to haecceity 
that seems to threaten with an undesirable relationality. ‘“That thing” 
could be taken in relational sense i. e. “the thing I am now looking at”. 
When it is taken in this way, then, of course, it does not intend the 
individual essence or haecceity referred to’ (Chisholm 1976, 35). 
Reference to haecceity obviously cannot be indexical reference though it 
takes the same form. Fortunately, the ambiguity cannot even arise in 
connection with individual essences of the qualitative sort since they can 
be referred to only non-indexically in virtue of their qualitative aspect. 
So, the problem of indexical reference is not a real threat to qualitative 
individual essences, but the issue is still open whether relational 
properties in general can be entailed by them. I do not think that 
relationality should be dismissed across the board. The reason becomes 
clear if we consider what the ‘genuine’ individuals are. Here, I have 
talked about some particulars being ‘genuine individuals’ but the criterion 
for being ‘genuine’ was left open. It seems that this criterion cannot be 
afforded by inspecting carefully the physical world. A promising 
criterion, however, needs the acknowledgment of some relational aspects 
in the notion of ‘genuine’ individual. Persons are undeniably genuine 
individuals - except for those who deny the existence of composites, and 
admit in their ontology only particles arranged in a certain way. But once 
persons are acknowledged, then those works of art and engineering, or 
even natural phenomena, that are endowed with features projected by 
persons, should also be considered as genuine individuals. To be an 
individual is thus derivative from being a person. Applying the notion of 
grounding, personhood grounds our claims about individual essences/
natures. The relational character of attributed or projected individuality is 
not conceived here in a Humean manner. Rather, I think that to be a 
genuine individual is a feature determined ultimately by our prevailing 
cultural scheme. The only safe point to start with is that being a person 
entails being a genuine individual. As to the further question what other 
things count as genuine individuals in the derivative mode, the answer 
depends on the prevailing cultural scheme.  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To sum it up, I have argued that the recent emphasis on the ontic notion 
of explanation increases the significance of qualitative individual 
essences. The explanatory-gap argument strengthened with the ontic 
variant supports postulating qualitative individual essences. It was 
claimed further, that their qualitative character is not to be conceived as 
the mere conjunction of properties; that is, it is not to be conceived in the 
way characteristic of (PII) and its converse. The alternative view 
recommended here takes individual natures or essences as structured, 
organizational units in the Aristotelian sense thereby exempting 
individual essences from falling under (PII) and its converse. Similarly, 
applying the two-tier bundle theories of individuals, instead of the naive 
(BT), would achieve the same result. It was also argued that 
individuation should be told apart from mere particularization of the 
specific nature. When comparing the roles of qualitative individual 
essence and haecceity, one finds that securing trans-world identity is the 
strongest argument in favor of both. However, if the explanatory role is 
considered, the notion of qualitative individual essence becomes 
increasingly important. !!!!!!!!!!!!!
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